Making Them Count: the Efficiency of Strikeouts vs. Balls in Play

Baseball fans have always been infatuated with the strikeout when it comes to pitchers. This infatuation has only strengthened in the past couple decades as statistical work has found pitchers to have far less control over what happens to a ball once it's put in play than previously thought. Current baseball statistics such as DIPS and FIP ("Defense Independent" and "Fielding Independent" ERA substitutes) rely heavily on a pitcher's K-rate to determine his value. There's an awful lot of good and not really much bad that can come from a strikeout, unlike a ball put in play, be it a ground ball, line drive, or fly ball. Hard to imagine anyone would not love them, isn't it? There is, however, a pretty strong sentiment among those in the game and those who follow the game that strikeouts carry a significant downside that can even outweigh their benefit at times. Namely, these people are concerned about the effects of high strikeout rates on pitch counts.

The argument goes that strikeouts require more pitches than outs on balls in play. After all, your fielders can convert an out for you on only one pitch, while a strikeout demands a minimum of 3. This argument is most often extended anecdotally to young pitchers who have yet to "learn to pitch" and, because of their inexperience, ego, stupidity, or any combination thereof, take themselves out of games early by running up their pitch counts chasing strikeouts when they should be inviting the batter to hit the ball.

This seems to make a lot of sense. So too, however, did the general notion that good pitchers as a rule were better at inducing outs on balls in play, so perhaps we better check into this theory as well. As it turns out, the two theories are somewhat linked. The assumption that contact plate appearances are better for pitch counts than strikeouts is heavily dependent on the rate at which outs are converted on contact plate appearances. If you can get a hitter to put the ball in play on one pitch, that's great, but if it takes 3 balls in play to record 1 out, then you might as well have just struck the guy out.

Obviously, it does not usually take 3 balls in play to get 1 out, but neither does it usually take 1 pitch to induce a ball in play. The question is, can contact be induced in few enough pitches to offset the number of balls in play it takes to record an out? We are concerning ourselves with pitches per out because the issue with pitch counts is how deep into the game a pitcher can go, and we measure that quantity in innings, or, in other words, in outs. Therefore, the primary concern is how efficiently a pitcher uses his pitches to record outs. This question is central to the issue of how strikeouts and contact PAs affect pitch counts, yet it is largely ignored or taken for granted. The answer is yes, it is more efficient to get outs by inducing contact, but just barely.

Since 2000, pitchers have used .15 more pitches per out to get strikeouts than to get an out on a ball put in play. In recent years, the gap is even smaller (about .10 over the past few years). The reason the difference is so close is that the number of balls in play required to convert an out, on average, very nearly offsets the drop in pitches required to induce contact versus striking a batter out.

Over the span considered, the league BABIP is just under .300. However, that figure excludes home runs for the simple reason that they are dealt with separately for most purposes: since we are only concerned with the conversion-rate of outs once the ball hits the bat, we have no reason to exclude HR, and the rate at which hits are recorded once the ball is hit rises to .325. This also excludes the error rate, which further reduces the probability an out is converted on a ball once it is hit. Of course, we must also add in the possibility for the double play, since 2 outs on one pitch are more efficient than just 1. Considered all together, these factors are just enough that it doesn't make much difference in your pitch count if you strike out more batters or get more outs on balls in play.

To illustrate this point, the following graphs show every pitching season since 2000 with at least 100 IP measuring the pitcher's pitches thrown/9 IP against his K/9 rate and against his H/9 rate. Keep in mind that since most pitchers allow very close to the league average BABIP over significant samples, hit rates are largely dependent on the rate of balls in play a pitcher allows, so we're basically looking at how pitch counts relate to high contact pitchers and to low contact pitchers:



As our data suggests, there is no emerging pattern that either high strikeout pitchers or high contact pitchers require more pitches to get through 9 innings. For the most part, it doesn't matter how frequently a Major League pitcher strikes out hitters or how frequently he allows hits as to how many pitches he has to throw. The trade offs of one compared to the other mostly cancel out.

What, then, is the primary determinant in a pitcher's pitch count? It's walks, of course. They are the one event that costs pitches with no chance of an out, and it shows. Look at the graph comparing pitchers' pitches/9 IP to their BB rates:


Now here is a clear pattern. Simply put, by far the strongest factor in how many pitches a pitcher needs to get through an inning is how frequently he walks batters. Almost every time you hear a broadcaster or analyst talk about how a pitcher throws too many pitches because he strikes out too many hitters, the real reason will be because the pitcher walks too many hitters, not that he strikes out too many (unless, of course, the personality has not checked the facts and is commenting on a pitcher who doesn't even throw more pitches per inning than normal). That's why pitchers like Roy Halladay, CC Sabathia, Cole Hamels, Johan Santana, Josh Beckett, Rickey Nolasco, and even Tim Lincecum were all taking fewer pitches than average to complete each inning in 2008 and pitchers like Barry Zito, Tom Gorzelanny, and Miguel Batista were all taking more pitches than average. It has nothing to do with the strikeouts. It's the walks.

Of course, there is some relationship between walks and strikeouts, but not enough that you can look at a pitcher's K-rate and tell all that much about his walk rate. The correlation of a pitcher's walk rate and K-rate is actually very weak-less than .1, which means if you know a pitcher's K-rate, you only really have about 10% of the information needed to estimate his BB-rate. An individual pitcher's K- and BB-rates will generally rise and fall together, but how those rates relate to each other varies widely from pitcher to pitcher. So while a pitcher with poor control may find it more effecient to cut down on his walks at the potential expense of some of his strikeouts, the strikeouts are really not the culprit, and a pitcher who already has good control has no reason to cut down on his strikeouts purely to reduce his pitch count, as he generally won't see any noticeable results.

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Splitting Hairs: Park Effects vs. Home/Away

One of the easily overlooked but essential factors in player evaluation is the consideration of park effects on player stats. Every park in the Majors affects stats differently, and to truly compare players on an even plane, we must account for this, especially for players in the most extreme parks. The problem, and likely one of the main reasons park effects can at times be overlooked, is that these effects are very difficult to get a good grasp on. We know Coors inflates hitting stats, but by how much, and which stats are most effected? These are difficult adjustments to make intuitively, so too often they are just skipped entirely, or thrown in as an afterthought when fans or mainstream analysts discuss numbers.

On the other hand, there are many who fall prey to another, potentially worse trap in evaluating park effects. They use a player's home/away splits to estimate the effects of the home park on a player's numbers and how his numbers would translate to another park.

There are many downfalls to this approach. The most obvious is that inherent in home/away splits is a home-hitter bias independent of park. Since 2000, hitters have put up an OPS of .774 at home and .745 on the road. So you're going to expect to see a .030 point difference on average even in a completely neutral park, and for some reason, this is rarely accounted for properly by fans who use this method. The assumption is all too often that a hitter's road line is what you'll get from him in a neutral park. In light of the clear home-hitter bias, this is obviously not the case.

Furthermore, there exists the possibility that a particular player will naturally exhibit a stronger home-away split for whatever reason. Some hitters may be more comfortable hitting at home than normal or more affected by traveling to road parks. An exaggerated home-away split does not isolate the home park as the primary factor, and it is common to see players on the same team post widely varying degrees of home-away splits, which should not be the case if these splits were heavily dependent on park effects.

There are also some indications that at least some parks, particularly those with the most extreme hitting environments, can actually suppress road production in addition to boosting home production. For example, pitches break differently at Coors because of the thinner air at altitude, so hitters who tune their swings to how pitches break in Coors will find the ball slightly more difficult to center in other parks than they would if they did not play half their games in Colorado (this phenomenon shows in Colorado's team line-drive rates, as well as in their opponents' rates in Coors).

The fact is, there are too many factors in play in home-road splits to truly estimate park effects. These other factors can be accounted for, but the reason home/away splits seem to be so popular is the ease with which they can be found and reported, and some of these adjustments are beyond the scope of what can be reasonably expected from most fans. Even if you do attempt them, they could take as much or more work than just using park factors to make your adjustments.

We have still not gotten to perhaps the biggest issue with using a player's home/away splits. Even assuming you have properly adjusted for the other issues with using a player's splits, you are invariably going to run into sample size issues. A full season's batting data is already pushing the lower limits of the number of at bats you'd like to see. By going to a player's splits, you are more than cutting your sample in half. You will commonly be dealing with AB totals under 250. To get an idea of the uncertainty present in such small samples, a .300 hitter will hit either under .270 or over .330 about 30% of the time over 250 ABs. You simply cannot garner much meaningful information from a player's home/away splits without at least using several years worth of data, even once you've accounted for everything else.

Take, for instance, Brad Hawpe's 2006 season, when he had over 270 PAs in both his home and away samples. His OPS was .144 points higher on the road, away from Coors. No one would have argued that he would hit .144 points better in OPS if he were traded to a neutral park. Or, consider the famously consistent Albert Pujols. In 2007, he hit .211 OPS points higher on the road. In 2008, he hit .119 points better at home. It's obvious that these data points are not reliable indicators of park effects, but fans and analysts routinely take equally unreliable single-season splits and use them to project severely overblown adjustments to players.

Of course, I can cherry pick outlier seasons to make my point just like any other fan does to make his, so if the above paragraph contained a bit too much anecdotal evidence for your liking, I'm with you. Don't worry. I've got more. Namely, I've got every set of paired seasons since 2000 where a player had at least 200 ABs both home and away for the same team two years in a row (there are 883 of them). Using this data, we can compare a player's splits one year to his splits the next and see how reliable they are. The following graph plots each player's splits one year on the X-axis and his splits the following year on the Y-axis. If the splits are reliable, we should see a definite line forming going from the lower left to the upper right.



As you can see, there is no such pattern here. The data is pretty weakly correlated (r=.21), indicating that a player's home/away splits one year are not a very good indicator of what they will be the next year. Home/away splits are simply too volatile to draw any reliable conclusions from for single players.

If we break down our sample to players who hit at least .100 OPS points higher at home, 41% of these players showed splits of .030 points or lower the following season. Of players who hit at least .150 points higher at home, 38% showed a split of .029 points or lower the next year. This, as we saw earlier, is the average home/away split in Major League Baseball over this time period. If we include all players who returned to within a standard deviation of the average, the percentages rise to 45% and 40%. Of the players who showed splits greater than .150 points, 63% cut that split in half or greater the following year. Players who show very high splits one year are still somewhat more likely to be higher than average playing for the same team the following year, but not nearly enough to tell anything significant by it.

When it comes to adjusting for park effects, player home/away splits just don't cut it as substitutes for park factors. They present a certain allure - they're easy to look up and easy to understand, and they sound convincing in their own pseudo-logical way - and for that they've become quite popular. To get a reliable grasp on park effects on a player's numbers, however, you need to be able to look beyond such crude methods. Ideally, find some park factors, or look up park-adjusted stats. In a lot of cases, you would be better off just not adjusting at all than taking the splits at face value. There are times when home/away splits may be appropriate, but make sure you have a good reason for using them over park factors or park-adjusted stats, make sure you are making the proper adjustments, and make sure you are looking at a large enough sample using several years, or even aggregates of several players if need be. Of course, when you do it right, home/away splits start to resemble park factors more and more. They essentially become a method of calculating park factors. But now we're just splitting hairs.
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King of the ʞastle

Matthew Carruth made a post at Fangraphs recently regarding the correlation between swinging strikes a pitcher gets on his fastball and his K-rate and that between called strikes on the fastball and K-rate. Not surprisingly, it's the pitchers who can make hitters miss who tend to rack up the strikeouts. But what about those pitchers who like to live on the corners? The control artists who somehow manage to rack up strikeouts while, to the untrained eye, throwing what amount to BP fastballs? Surely these exceptions exist. We've all seen them, been baffled by them, been tricked into thinking we could hit Major League pitching by them. They have to exist, don't they?

Of course they exist. And there's one who stands above them all.

To find the pitchers who most excel at the called strikeout, we turn to Retrosheet's pitch sequence data to categorize each strikeout. Starting in 1988, we have most of this data available: from 1988 to 1999, 4.5% of strikeouts are left uncategorized, and the data from 2000 on is complete. Over this time, 70.4% of categorized strikeouts came on swings and misses, much like Mr. Carruth would have expected. 26.9% came on called strikes, and 2.1% came on caught foul tips. A handful came on other events, such as missed or fouled bunt attempts or swing attempts on pitchouts to protect a hit and run. This gives us an average ratio of called strikeouts to swinging strikeouts of .382.

It should come as no surprise that the pitcher with the most called strikeouts since 1988, in our partial sample, is Randy Johnson with 1231. He has, after all, struck out more hitters than anyone in the game over that period, and it's not even close. Roger Clemens is in a similar position of having a vastly greater amount of strikeouts than anyone below him on this list; he comes in at #3 on this list with 1202. The guy between them, with a full 1539 Ks fewer than the Unit and 728 Ks fewer than the Rocket, is Greg Maddux, with 1227 called strikeouts. Keep in mind that the 4 strikeout difference between Johnson and Maddux is nothing compared to the 4.5% of strikeouts from the late '80s and '90s that are missing from these calculations, and if we look at the number of uncategorized strikeouts each had and their called-strikeout rates, there's a 78% chance Maddux actually has as many called strikeouts as Johnson since 1988, and a 73% chance he has more. So we can say with reasonable confidence that Greg Maddux has more called strikeouts than any pitcher since 1988.

After these three above 1200, only two pitchers had more than 800 called strikeouts: Mussina at 902 and Glavine at 810. By sheer volume and ratio combined, Maddux is the clear king of the called strikeout, at least since 1988. The only pitchers who can touch his total are far behind him in called:swinging ratio, and the only pitchers who are in a league with Maddux in C:S ratio are nowhere near his total.

By C:S ratio alone, however, there are a handful of pitchers better than Maddux at keeping bats on shoulders that could have otherwise likely hit the ball. Maddux' ratio of .656 is still the 7th best among pitchers with at least 1000 strikeouts, but the top spot this time belongs to John Burkett. Burkett pitched for 5 teams in 14 full seasons and racked up 1766 strikeouts as a 2-time All Star. In our sample, Burkett struck out .838 batters looking for every 1 he struck out swinging, a full .100 better than the next pitcher on the list (Mark Garnder, with a ratio of .737 in 1256 Ks). From Gardner, there's another big drop to Mike Morgan at .676 in 1090 Ks, and then he, Rick Helling, Bartolo Colon, and Estoban Loaiza are pretty tightly packed in Maddux' range. Like I said, no one of Maddux' notability here. Burkett's 758 called strikeouts are actually 6th, right after Glavine, in our sample, but no one else here has even half of Maddux' called strikeout total.

If we set the cutoff at 2000 Ks to focus on the true strikeout pitchers, Maddux is the clear winner again. The closest to his .656 ratio is Mussina at .524. Glavine, at .507, is the only other pitcher here with at least half as many called strikeouts as swinging strikeouts. For comparison, Clemens' ratio is .458 and Johnson's is .363. Clearly, this generation hasn't seen another strikeout artist in the mold of Greg Maddux.

While Greg could certainly miss his fair share of bats (he's still 6th since 1988 in swinging strikeouts), there is no one else in recent memory who could fool hitters in the zone like he could. With his devastating late movement and complete command of every pitch he threw, hitters were damned if they did and damned if they didn't with Maddux on the mound. With his ability to make hitters walk back to the dugout without so much as a wave at the ball, he's raised more money for kangaroo courts across the NL than anyone in the history of the game, a record as untouchable as Cy Youngs 749 complete games, inflation be damned. In short, he's the best there ever was. Since 1988.
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Grand Slams by the #3 Hitter (with a catch)

On April 26 of last year, Matt Kemp accomplished one of the rarest feats you'll see on a ball field. He batted third, and he still managed to hit a grand slam...in the first inning.

Traditionally, the best hitters in baseball inhabit the #3 spot in the order. From Cobb to Ruth to Williams to Pujols, it's one thing that hasn't changed much in baseball history. In fact, even notorious anti-traditionalist Tony LaRussa responded to questions about batting Pujols 4th with, "“Where did Stan hit? I’ll leave it that,” (per Derrick Goold). So this is a time-honored tradition, even among the baseball heathens. The downside, and the source of questions about where Pujols should hit, is that you aren't maximizing the potential baserunners for your stud hitter out of the gate. You don't get to see that first inning, bases loaded, best hitter at the plate scenario that gets fans on their feet early. Or at least not very often. As such, there has always been a counter-movement to hit the best hitter 4th, especially when he specializes in power.

It is, however, possible for the #3 hitter to come up with the bases loaded in the first inning by his team batting around, and it does happen occasionally. Very occasionally, but it does happen. Since 1954, it's happened 42 times. Who are the hitters, besides Kemp, who've managed to settle, for 1 at bat at least, the debate of 3rd or 4th by providing the best of both? Who else has hit a first inning grand slam from the 3-spot?

There are only 3 others post-1954 to do it. The most recent before Kemp was Travis Hafner, on August 13, 2006. Before him, it was Chipper Jones, on October 5, 2001. Then, it's way back to 1964, when Billy Williams did the trick in a May 1 game against the Colts. And that's it. So there's your obscure exclusive list of the day: 1 Hall of Famer, 1 future Hall of Famer, 1 promising young outfielder, and some guy named Pronk.

By the way, Pujols did have one such opportunity, on May 8, 2005. What was he able to do when the pitcher absolutely had to throw strikes? He walked, of course.
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Greek God of What?

Kevin Youkilis had a huge year in 2008, shedding the mantle of "Greek God of Walks" for something a little more, well, powerful. He had always been a very good hitter, especially in the realm of plate discipline, but last year, he became arguably the best hitter in a loaded Boston line-up, leading a team that included David Ortiz, Manny Ramirez, J.D. Drew, Jason Bay, and Dustin Pedroia in such favourites as wOBP, wRAA, REW, Fangraphs' Batting Runs, SLG, and OPS, many by wide margins. While Youk's .390 OPB was again outstanding, it was right on line with his career averages (.390, .381, and .400 in the previous three years). The .312 BA was a good step up, but not really outside what you can expect to see from a .290 hitter every once in a while. It was the .569 SLG, a full .116 points higher than his career best set the year before, that vaulted him to a slightly less dismissible position on Olympus. And behind that spike in SLG, of course, was a .092 point spike in isolated power (ISO).

The good news for Youk is that ISO is generally accepted as the more stable component of SLG. There's certainly some truth to that. ISO regresses much less heavily than BA, and the correlation is much stronger for ISO from one year to the next (the correlation coefficient-closer to 1 means stronger correlation-for ISO from one year to the next over the past 6 paired seasons is .74, compared to .42 for BA). However, ISO, on average, also changes more each year than BA. The average player's BA only changed 8.2% (.023 points) from one year to the next, while his ISO changed 20.0% (.034 points)on average. I know that sounds like it doesn't make sense, and I won't go into all the details of why, but basically, it is because ISO is spread out much more between players even though it is on a smaller scale. So while a great hitter in ISO might only be at about .250, he can be over .100 points ahead of other players just as easily as a good hitter in BA can be .050 points ahead of hitters the same distance behind him. A good hitter in ISO can drop .050 points and still be good in ISO much more easily than a hitter can drop .050 points in BA and still be good. Compared to the spread between talent in each stat, ISO is more stable. But players will also see larger swings in their ISO.

That's a lot to take in, and I don't blame you if you just skipped it. Instead of poring through it again, take a look at the following graphs. The x-axis is a player's BA/ISO in one year, and the y-axis is his BA/ISO in the next. The line shown is the line of best fit, and the slope gives you an idea of how much each stat tends to regress toward the mean (greater slope means less regression):




While BA is clearly more scattered and more prone to regression, it has much less area to move around in. Batting averages are packed into a tighter range than ISO. This added range for ISO to jump around in means that Youk, or any hitter, is actually more likely to take points off his SLG from ISO than from BA. That doesn't mean ISO is not a good indicator of power. It's an excellent indicator of power, and it separates good hitters from poor much more significantly than BA. We do, however, have to take its stability with a grain of salt, especially after large jumps like we see in Youkilis' 2008.

In the past 5 paired seasons for which we can examine both the jump in ISO in 1 year and how any large spikes in ISO regressed the following year, there have been 13 hitters who saw 1-year jumps of at least .090 points. All but three of them dropped significantly from that peak the following year. The following graph lists all 13 players along with how big a spike they saw in ISO and how far their ISO dropped the following year (note the significant "busts" among the list).


Spikes in ISO greater than .090
Yr. of Spike
Player
Spike
Regression
2003
Edmonds
.092
-.001
2003
Varitek
.113
-.054
2004
Beltre
.110
-.137
2004
Se. Casey
.093
-.099
2004
Konerko
.093
-.007
2004
Ar. Ramirez
.092
.006
2005
C. Tracy
.122
-.075
2005
Ensberg
.137
-.046
2005
Br. Roberts
.099
-.077
2006
Beltran
.172
-.071
2006
Durham
.106
-.120
2006
Teahen
.097
-.101
2007
A. Rodriguez
.099
-.075

So one-year spikes, at least in recent history, do not seem to be very sustainable. A more gradual build-up may be, but chances are very high that Youkilis sees his ISO fall back below .200 in 2009. He could still maintain a solid improvement over his previous high of .165, but a lot of the big numbers he saw in 2008 that derived from that huge ISO are likely not going to be there again.

Likewise, you should always be careful at projecting the continuation of power surges simply because they are propped up by the more stable ISO rather than a high BA. If the ISO is well out of line with a player's career, then it is likely to see some significant regression just like you would expect from, say, a BABIP that is well out of line with career norms. Steady progression in ISO, like Youk has had in the past few years, is a good sign, but when you are dealing with a one-year spike this big, scale it back to the career path you were seeing before. For Youk, that means continued improvement from his 2007 levels, but nothing like the 2008 production. So Youk, don't be too quick to drop that title as "Greek God of Walks". After all, it might not be there forever.
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Closer of the Year: Part 3

I set this whole series up as a search for the Closer of the Year, so I guess that now that I've taken the time to explain who I don't think that is, I might as well go ahead and devote some time to covering a few pitchers who deserve recognition for their top notch work. In particular, there are three relievers I want to examine, although one of them is not a closer. There are a few more relievers who had great years which I won't cover here, like the always good and under-appreciated Joe Nathan, the no-longer-under-the-radar Joakim Soria, and the breakout Brad Zeigler (ok, he's just listed here because he's from my hometown, but he did have an unexpectedly good rookie campaign), but these three set themselves apart with their remarkable production in 2008.

The first 2 will surprise no one. They are, as you can probably deduce by process of elimination, Mo Rivera and Jonathan Papelbon. If you read my last article (who am I kidding?), you knew one of those names for certain. The third, however, will undoubtedly raise some eyebrows. As I said, he's not a closer, and he was buried in a very deep bullpen. He went continuously under the radar this year and inexplicably missed making the All Star team. His name is Hong-Chih Kuo.

Kuo ranked in the top 5 among relievers in WHIP, WPA/LI, REW, and K:BB ratio and led all relievers in FIP. He's not here as a dark horse or shock value candidate. He's here because he belongs (well, if you take the term "Closer" out of the title anyway). A while back, I wrote a brief article on the artificial inflation of LH specialists' stats due to two primary advantages (the platoon advantage and the advantage of being used later in innings), but that's not what we're looking at with Kuo. Strangely enough, he actually faced right-handed hitters more frequently than the average pitcher in 2008, probably a product of staying in the game to face all the RH pinch hitters opposing managers sent in to face him, and while he did pitch slightly less with 0 out and more with 1 out than average, he pitched less than average with 2 out. Kuo is no left-handed specialist by any sense of the term. In fact, Kuo only failed to complete a full inning 4 times (10% of his relief appearances) all year, compared to 26 times (67%) he went 4 or more outs and 6 times (15%) he went 3+ innings in relief. He was also used as an emergency starter 3 times last year. So he's got the stuff for regular use, and his usage is actually less optimal for his stats than that of most closers who go only an inning at a time in most cases.

So when we see Kuo's K/9 mark of 11.16, it's not just some specialist dominating lefties with a frisbee slider that he can't throw to righties without hitting them in the knees. It's legit. It's also pretty much right on target with what he's done in his career as a reliever (11.07). His BB/9 (1.95) saw a lot of improvement this year (3.94 career as a reliever), which propelled him from a high power strikeout artist to an elite overall level. A graph of his GB:FB ratios over his career looks like a game of Pong, but it was back up to 1.38 in 2008, which helped keep his HR rate, which has always been very good regardless of his GB:FB ratio, down.

Next is Papelbon. Boston's version of Joba Chamberlain put the kibosh on his own return to the rotation and has emerged as the top candidate to take over the torch being passed on by Trevor Hoffman and Mo Rivera. In his third year as Boston's closer, he put forth arguably his finest effort yet. His dominance of the strike zone hit a new high this year as he struck out 77 and walked only 8 (K:BB ratio of 9.63). His walk rate of 1.04 was third best in baseball behind Matt Capps, who strikes out far fewer batters, and Mo Rivera, and the next lowest after Papelbon is over a half a walk per 9 higher. Papelbon has always been a great K:BB pitcher (5.77 and 5.60 in his first 2 seasons), and this year he took it to a new level. He was second to Mo in K:BB ratio and second to Kuo in FIP in baseball.

Even with by the highest BABIP of his career (.313) and by far the worst strand rate of his career (69.5%, after being above 88% in each of his first two seasons), Papelbon still posted a 2.32 ERA. He led baseball with 11 multi-inning saves, more than twice as many as everyone but Mo Rivera and Brian Wilson. His 4 "tough" saves (saves where the tying or winning run is on base when the pitcher enters the game) were second in baseball. The Sox didn't hesitate to bring in their bullpen ace when things got tough in the 8th inning and let him play his own set-up role once in a while. It's hardly the old days where the bullpen ace came in for the biggest outs no matter when they came, but Papelbon is the closest thing to that we have in the game today. While a large part of that is certainly just the philosophy of the Red Sox, it takes the right pitcher to make it work, and it's a more difficult usage pattern Papelbon is following than most closers.

Already one of the games best closers, Papelbon took another step forward in 2008. But he didn't take over the mantle of best in the game just yet. That still belongs to the old master, Mo Rivera. With a WHIP of 0.67 and a K:BB ratio of 12.83, Mo gave us a once in a generation type season. The only other pitcher to post either a WHIP or a K:BB ratio that good was Dennis Eckersley, way back in 1990, when he struck out 73 and walked only 4. Mo's 77 K, 6 BB 2008 season is unrivaled by pretty much anyone since.

Mo's 39 saves (in 40 opps) came with 5 tough saves, the most in baseball. Only 3 times all year did he fail to complete an inning, but in none of those 3 did he record a loss or a blown save, nor did he allow a run, a walk, or an extra base hit. In those 3 games, he faced 3 batters, struck out 2, and gave up a ground ball single to the other. Not once the entire season did he allow more than 1 run in a game. Only twice in Major League history has a pitcher thrown that many games without allowing multiple runs in any of them (Rafael Betancourt last year and Mike Myers in 2000, though Myers was a lefty specialist who mostly went 1 or 2 outs at a time and never went more than an inning), and never has a closer performed such a feat in as many games or innings. Never has anyone done it with so few appearances under an inning.

Mo led baseball in getting hitters to chase pitches out of the zone (36.3% O-Swing%). He also led baseball in BB/9, WPA/LI, and REW by pretty healthy margins. He was third in FIP and second in WPA. Fangraphs places him at the top of their Value Wins (a stat based on FIP and IP) list for relievers (Papelbon is second and Kuo fourth, by the way). His OPS against of .423 was a full .080 points better than the next best reliever (Joakim Soria at .503). He was also excellent, as always, at preventing home runs. His GB:FB ratio of 1.77 was a bit lower than his career mark (1.86), but he was still a decidedly ground-ball pitcher. He is one of the few pitchers who has shown a legitimate skill at preventing HR on fly balls at a significantly better rate than average, with a career HR/FB mark of 5.6% since 2002 (when batted ball currently data goes back to) and no single season over 7.5% (a high he actually posted in 2008). His career HR/9 rate of .47 is the lowest of any pitcher with at least 250 IP since 1993 (Tom Tango's documented beginning of the HR explosion), and 2008 was no exception to his inside-the-park ways. His famed cutter has also allowed him to consistently post better than average BABIP rates despite pitching with consistently horrible defenses behind him, so while his .232 BABIP in 2008 was undoubtedly a bit lucky, it's not as out of line as it would be for other pitchers, and keep in mind that his skill at preventing solid contact is even greater than his career BABIP rates show because he pitches in front of such a bad defense, so we are legitimately seeing some skill here. Even if we ignore that skill and assuming it was all luck, however, and look at metrics that eliminate BABIP from consideration (i.e. K:BB, FIP, Win Values, GB:FB, and HR rates), Rivera still rates as the best in the game despite being underrated by stats that ignore his skill at preventing solid contact.

It was truly a special year from Mo Rivera. It's a shame that he never really got the accolades he deserved for it with most of the mainstream attention going to K-Rod and Lidge, but his dominance didn't escape our attention here at 3-DBaseball, nor did it escape the attention of analysts across the country. I'm far from the first to point out the supremacy of Mo's season, and I'll not be the last. When people look back on his HOF career, they'll see his 2008 season shining on an already brilliant resume. He'll be the Eckersley to K-Rod's Bobby Thigpen. It could even be this kind of performance at an advanced age that vaults him ahead of Hoffman even more than his postseason performances. For all that, Mo Rivera is 2008's closer of the year.
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Should We Have a Moral Obligation to Avoid A-Rod in Fantasy Leagues?

The entire baseball community was dealt a devastating blow this past weekend when it was revealed that Alex Rodriguez, long built up to be the man who would clean up the records tarnished by the villains of the steroid era, was in fact one of those villains himself. The reaction I had to learning this news was a feeling I haven’t experienced since the announcement of the findings in the Mitchell Report, and they are feelings that I’m not sure I’ll ever be able to accurately convey in words. There are so many things that will (and should) be talked about with this announcement, but I’d like to initiate a dialogue (or at least a monologue) on the impact that this announcement should have on our fantasy leagues. Should we feel a moral obligation to not draft A-Rod based on this tragic news, or is he still fair game?

Obviously, this was a crippling revelation for Major League Baseball, and I believe that it should be dealt with and assessed very seriously by Selig and the powers that be. However, the issue in regard to fantasy baseball is whether or not having a moral opposition to steroids in baseball is the same as having a moral opposition to drafting a player who is a known user of steroids. I don’t think there’s a fan among us who thinks that using steroids is morally acceptable, but does this moral belief directly translate to the realm of fantasy baseball? While this is certainly a tricky issue with a lot of grey area, I think it’s safe to say that these two circumstances are separate entities that do not necessarily have to mirror one another.

The goal of any fantasy owner is simple: win your league. You do this by fielding the best team, which, presumably, is done by drafting the best players available. These vague and general terms hardly capture the intricacies of everyone’s drafting strategies, but most of our strategies are basically extensions of these general principles. That being said, if you perceive A-Rod to be the best player available when you’re on the clock, do you not owe it to yourself to draft him? Or, more importantly, if you’re in a keeper league, wouldn’t you be putting yourself at a huge disadvantage for not keeping the best player on your roster because you need to satisfy your conscience? Think of it this way: do you think the Yankees are going to let him go because of this news? Do you think they’re going to simply dismiss his contributions and his numbers because he’s tied to steroids? Did they do that with Pettitte? Of course not. They’re a competitive team competing in a highly-competitive division, so they’re going to do everything they can to be the best team. I see no reason why you shouldn’t employ the same logic. Why should you punish yourself for this athlete’s personal decisions?

Furthermore, what message do you think you’re going to send by not drafting A-Rod in your fantasy league? Do you really think it’s going to alert the world of what a grave tragedy this is for the game? The only impact it will have is within the small circle of those in your league. And even if you’re in a league like ours here at 3-D Baseball where everyone is family, it’s not going to have that big of an impact. You could take the moral high ground, but I don’t think anyone will really care. They certainly won’t remember that you made that choice in three months unless you remind them constantly. And they probably won’t judge you too much if you did draft him, anyway. Besides, are you not going to draft anyone who used steroids? Especially after we find out the other 103 names on that list of positive users, that may not even be possible.

And even if you don’t draft A-Rod based on your moral code, I guarantee you that someone else in your league will be willing to compromise his moral standards. And it’s not that this person would be all that nuts about drafting someone with the taint of steroids, but why would you pass up such a fantasy talent if he did fall to you that late simply because others weren’t willing to draft him? Is it worth it to put yourself at this kind of disadvantage?

I think it’s also important to ask ourselves whether this is entirely relevant in the topic of fantasy sports. In a way it reminds me of the Bill Clinton impeachment scandal of the 90’s. His affair was morally wrong – no one was questioning that. The debate about the impeachment, however, centered around whether that moral wrongdoing would effect his ability to lead the country as he had before. While there was a lot of partisan bickering, in the end it was deemed that the two circumstances – his immoral decision and his national leadership – did not affect one another.

In this same way I’m not sure that A-Rod’s steroid use is entirely relevant to the fantasy community. In our fantasy leagues we’re only concerned with the stats that players provide, not the context in which they are achieved. This is vastly different from baseball in real life for this one reason: while stats are equally crucial in MLB, the historical context of those stats is what is most important about them. The fact that A-Rod used steroids to help him get over 500 career homeruns wouldn’t matter if that number wasn’t historically significant. No one would care that much when A-Rod hits his 756th homerun if it wasn’t the shot that pushed him past Aaron’s eternally historic mark. And while I’m not saying that any benefits that a steroid user gets to give him better stats in a season over a non-user are not significant, I am saying that the edge in this situation is relatively meaningless when you compare this player’s numbers to those that have defined the sport for generations.

In conclusion, I’m not saying that I’m OK with the news that transpired over the weekend. Hell, I’m pretty damn far from OK. I can’t tell you how hard it is for me to swallow this pill that has drugged the game I’ve always loved and professed to love for the rest of my life. I am saying, though, that these are two different conversations. Don’t feel like you’re compromising your moral integrity just because you choose to draft A-Rod this spring. If nothing else, just tell yourself that fantasy baseball is a business of winning, and you’re just making a business decision.
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